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NUMBER 1, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 


IMPRESSIONS 
of A COMPANY 
COMMANDER 


Le CAPITAINE BREVETfi DU GENIE POTEZ 


Translated from Revue du Genie 
Militaire, July-August, 1901, by 

CAPTAIN J. R. WILLIAMS 
Artillery Corps, U. S. Army 

CAPTAIN F. R. SHUNK 
Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army 

1ST LIEUT. E. M. RHETT 
Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army 

REVISED EDITION 


WASHINGTON BARRACKS, D. C., 
PRESS OF THE ENGINEER SCHOOL, 
1905. 














































































































































































I 





















NUMBER 1, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

lj.S ENGINEER SCHOOL, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 

IMPRESSIONS 
of A COMPANY 
COMMANDER 

21 , 

Lf. CAPITAINE BREVETfi DU GENIE POTEZ 


Translated from Revue du Genie 
Militaire, July-August, 1901, by 

CAPTAIN J. R. WILLIAMS 
Artillery Corps, U. S. Army 

CAPTAIN F. R. SHUNK 
Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army 

1ST LIEUT. E. M. RHETT 
Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army 

REVISED EDITION 


WASHINGTON BARRACKS, D. C., 
PRESS OF THE ENGINEER SCHOOL, 
1905 . 












First edition, April, 1902. 

Second edition, (Revised), February, 1905. 


MAR 21 19C3 

D. of D. 


PREFACE. 


1 he object of the present essay is not a general study comprising 
all the details of command, instruction and administration in an 
Engineer company. We desire merely to convey to our young com¬ 
rades, who may be called upon to exercise the important functions of 
company commander, certain observations that our personal expe - 
rience has suggested, and that may be of use to them in the exercise 
of their command. 

We have been obliged to enter into a few considerations of a 
rather general character. At the present time, the regiments of 
Engineers are passing through a true period of transition. Although 
instruction in the "Schools” has been a thing of the past for several 
years, yet the instruction by company is not universally practiced. 
The result is that our company commanders do not always enjoy the 
initiative that they should have, and that some of our methods of 
instruction, although conforming to the regulations, may still be 
regarded as experimental. Thus we have been induced to discuss the 
conditions under which the command of an Engineer company should 
be exercised, as well as such modifications in the present methods of 
instruction should be rationally introduced. 

We have deliberately left out everything that relates to the general 
organization of the arm. Taking the troops as they are, we have 
striven merely to discover the best methods to be employed with a 
view to their preparation for war. 












































































































































































































































































































CONTENTS. 


Page 

PART I._ 1 

Introduction *_,_ 1 

COMMAND_ 6 

Discipline_ 6 

Officers_ 11 

The non-commissioned officers_ 14 

The corporals_ 16 

The Mess_ 18 

PART II_ 21 

Instruction_ 21 

MILITARY INSTRUCTION _ 21 

Drill regulations_21 

Field duties_ 22 

Marching_*_23 

Target practice_ 25 

TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION _ 27 

Fortification of the battlefield_ 27 

The winter season_.•— 29 

APPENDIX_ 32 

Saps and mines--- 34 

Bridges_ 36 

Field fortification_ 41 




















































































































































































































IMPRESSIONS OF 
A COMPANY COMMANDER. 

PART I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

The company, troop or battery constitutes a unit of command, the 
effective strength of which is sufficiently small to enable its chief 
to know all his subordinates intimately, and at the same time suffici¬ 
ently large to require that its command should be instructed to an 
officer whose rank and experience will enable him to regulate all the 
details of the command, instruction and administration of his unit. 

The importance that is attached to the office of company, troop, or 
battery commander, even in the regulations, is thus easily understood. 
This applies evidently to the Engineers as well as to the other arms 
of the service. 

What is, or rather what should be, a company commander, in a 
regiment of Engineers? 

On mobilization, and even during the autumn maneuvers, the cap¬ 
tains commanding Engineer companies become, for the most part, on 
a small scale, chiefs of seperate units. While those commanding the 
companies attached to army corps are subordinate to the Chief Engi¬ 
neers of the army corps, those commanding the divisional companies,* 

*In each of the 20 army corps in the French Army there is a corresponding bat¬ 
talion of Engineers which has the same number, and which joins its army corps in 
ca§e of mobilization. 

This battalion furnishes one company to each division of infantry, and one company 
to the headquarters of the army corps. 

The 4th companies of battalions would be attached to the large engineer parks of 
armies or be employed in the fortresses. 

In time of peace the battalions of Engineers are concentrated at the regimental 
headquarters, which are as follows: 

1st and 5th regiments, Versailles; 2d, Montpellier; 3d, Arras; 4th, Grenoble; 6th, 
Angers; and 7th, Avignon. 



2 


which are in the greater number, are directly under the orders of the 
Division Commander. Although the number of men under their 
orders is inconsiderable, yet, the salvation of the division to which 
they are attached, or the success of the operations, may depend on the 
manner in which they execute the mission intrusted to them. This 
will be the case, for example, when the company is charged with rap¬ 
idly preparing for the passage of a stream that the division must cross, 
either to march upon the enemy or to escape his grasp; or, in a re¬ 
treat, when it is a question of destroying some structure necessary 
to the enemy’s pursuit. On the battlefield orders will not always 
arrive in time, and officers of Engineers will often be obliged to uti¬ 
lize, on their own responsibility, the resources at their disposal, in 
order to provide for the passage of a stream, to create hasty points of 
support, etc. 

These officers should possess, therefore, in addition to a thoroughly 
developed professional education, a vigilant spirit of initiative, and a 
decision of character that will permit them to act without hesitation 
when the circumstances require it. These qualities are even more 
necessary in the Engineers than in the other branches of the service, 
with the exception of the cavalry; for in the other branches superior 
officers are at hand to rectify the mistakes committed, or to direct per¬ 
sonally those subordinates who appear to be going wrong. 

It appears evident, therefore, that the company commanders in the 
Engineer regiments should enjoy the greatest latitude in the com¬ 
mand and instruction of their units. In addition to the certain 
benefit to the discipline and instruction of the men that results from 
such independence, it is unquestionably the best means of developing 
in the officers themselves, the spirit of initiative, decision, and pro¬ 
fessional knowledge. 

If, however, we examine the facts of the case, we find that the 
introduction of new ideas, in regard to command and instruction, 
appears to be more difficult in the Engineers than elsewhere. 

As regards instruction, this may result partially from the fact that, 
although the "School” no longer has charge of the instruction of 
the troops, yet there remains in the regiments, no doubt on account 
of tradition, a tendency to centralize excessively everything pertaining 
to instruction. 

In the eyes of certain officers such a method in command and in¬ 
struction is justified by the two following considerations: 

(1) As the technical instruction necessitates the employment of 


3 


material which is common to the whole regiment, it is necessary to 
place the various portions of this material at the desposal of each 
of the companies in succession, and on this account to limit each to 
a stipulated time. 

(2) The majority of officers of Engineers pass the greater part of 
their career in the special staff of the army. When they return to 
the regiment, they must post themselves on the methods of instruc¬ 
tion, which may be new to them, and they must also reacquire 
soldierly habits. As some inexperience on their part is to be feared, 
it is thought necessary to maintain a close supervision over their 
action in the exercise of command and in the instruction of their 
men. 

Doubtless the distribution of the material among the companies 
compels some restriction as to the employment of time, but it does 
not seem necessary to go as far as is generally done, by dividing the 
area of the polygon into as many "trenches” as there are different 
schools, and by devoting the same number of drills in each company 
to the same kind of work. 

There are many causes which prevent all the companies from con¬ 
veniently employing their time in an identical manner. One of the 
most frequent of these arises from periods of bad weather, which, 
occuring during the whole or a part of the time allowed for a 
"School,” make a certain number of supplementary drills indispen- 
sible. It is impossible to conduct these if such a system is employed. 

Again, the individual members of the company do not require the 
same amount of drill in the various schools of instruction. Take 
for example a company which has received in its contigent of re¬ 
cruits a number of quarrymen, excavators, or miners, who are, on 
account of their trade, perfectly familiar with the various kinds of 
earth work. As we shall show later, the training of the sapper in 
this kind of work must be considered as an essential part of his in¬ 
struction. It is, therefore, logical to divide the company into two 
parts. The first will include the men who, before their enlistment, 
were skilled in handling the pick and shovel. It is sufficient to 
teach these men the posting of the workmen, the distribution of the 
tools, and the trace and profile of the various trenches in the regula¬ 
tions, and to have them throw up once or twice each style of 
intrenchment. The second part will include those men who have 
never touched a shovel or pick before their arrival in the regiment, 
and who must be subjected to methodical training. These will take 


4 


part, of course, in the exercises of the whole company in battle for¬ 
mation, but the greater part of their instruction will consist of a 
number of progressive drills in excavation, to harden and train the 
muscles of the weaker and clumsier men. Those who are excavators 
by trade, and who would derive no benefit whatever from these exer¬ 
cises, will employ their time more usefully in other portions of the 
course of instruction. In case of necessity, they may be even employed 
on the details of guard and fatigue on those particular days in order 
to permit those that are most greatly in need of it to be present at the 
excavation exercises. 

As each captain is best acquainted with the progress of his company 
in the various drills, and with the special aptitude of his subord¬ 
inates, he should be required only to complete the various portions of 
the course of instruction within the time fixed by the commanding 
officer. The division of the time should be regulated by him, under 
the supervision of his battalion commander. Each battalion should 
be alloted the different classes of material, between certain dates. 
The battalion commander should, in turn, place various portions of 
this material at the disposal of captains, for stipulated periods. The 
number of hours that the company commanders would devote to each 
kind of drill would not be obligatory. There would be a limit to 
the time that he could devote to each, but if the men were sufficiently 
instructed in less time he would not be required to continue the drill 
for a longer period. He would in such cases report the progress of 
his company to the battalion commander,who would authorize him to 
employ the remainder of the time in drills which had been taken up 
previously, but in which his company was not sufficiently instructed; 
or, if the necessary material for such drills were not available, in 
field exercises, too many of which can never be conducted. 

Let us now examine the argument in regard to the inexperience 
of the officers, and see what conclusions may be drawn from it. 

It is certain that a captain returning to the regiment after eight or 
ten years’ service in the special staff will find many changes in the drill 
regulations, and in technical instruction and administration. He 
must therefore learn many things over again and may be expected, at 
first, to show some hesitation in the execution of his duties. 

Thus ''brushing up” is necessary. It should be facilitated in every 
way, in order that it may be speedily and completely attained. The 
most efficacious means to this end, surely, is to give the officer all the 
initiative compatible with his position. If he makes mistakes, his 


5 


superiors are at hand to correct them before grave consequences result. 
To restrict an officer in his responsibility and to deprive him of initia¬ 
tive, can only defeat the end to be attained. Such a course is no 
more than a palliative. It can do no more than produce a dangerous 
stage effect, by allowing the regiment to present a good appearance 
at inspection, without the training and discipline necessary for ser¬ 
vice in the field. The truly important point is to secure efficient 
command of the companies when the new men received at mobi¬ 
lization have broken the correct allignment of the barrack yard, and 
when they have left the orderly rooms and offices of the garrison, and 
are scattered in the fortifications, and in the army corps and divisions. 
What cohesion and discipline will these companies have if their 
captains have been deprived of active and full command? 

Should we suppose that after they have devoted their time to a 
serious study of the regulations, and after they have received from 
their commanding officers precise but broad instructions, indicating 
to them the object to be attained, the time to be employed for that 
purpose, and if necessary the main outlines of the methods to be fol¬ 
lowed—should we suppose that the majority of Engineer officers are 
unequal to making excellent Engineers, capable of doing credit to 
their companies and regiments out of the men that the annual con¬ 
scription places in their hands? The contrary is certainly the case. 
If from the standpoint of military routine, we have observed a few 
sins of omission in some who are excellent officers in other respects, 
such a condition results partly, no doubt, from the multiplicity of 
their duties, but chiefly from the fact that, during their service with 
their regiments, their opportunities for acting on their own responsi¬ 
bility have been by far too few. 

We repeat therefore, that in order to develop in our Engineer 
company commanders both the professional knowledge and the decis¬ 
ion of character necessary in the field, the only proper method is to 
give them in peace the greatest possible responsibility in the command 
and instruction of their companies. 

More than once in this essay we shall be brought back to the fact 
that in time of war the majority of the company commanders of 
Engineer troops must, in technical matters, act on their own initiative. 
They must therefore, in time of peace, be trained to depend on 
their own resources. In our opinion this is the controlling idea 
which should govern their preparation for war. 

Besides, it is very clear that it is out of the question to pursue a 


6 


uniform course with regard to all officers. If, along with company 
commanders who are vigorous, intelligent and progressive, there may be 
found some rather below the mark, it is the duty of their immediate 
superiors, their battalion commanders, to guard against the disadvan¬ 
tages resulting from any failings in their subordinates, and, if possible, 
to eliminate the failings, or at least to diminish them. Thus they 
will guide with a tighter rein those who betray too much inexperience. 
They will stimulate those who err through laxity. Such is in our 
opinion, the essential functions of the battalion commanders of 
Engineer regiments, the battalions of which do not exist as war units, 
as they must distribute their companies on mobilization among the 
fortifications and the army corps and divisions. 

COMMAND. 

DISCIPLINE. 

"Disicpline is a virtue which impels us to carry into effect the 
intentions of our chief, through a sense of duty and of the general 
welfare, by devoting to this end the whole physical, moral and 
intelectual energy of which we are capable.”* 

Discipline, as it should be understood in modern armies, seems to 
be very precisely defined in this sentence. 

What are the means that will enable us to obtain it; and first of 
all, what role , and how much importance should be assigned to pun¬ 
ishments? 

Always more or less humiliating for those who undergo them, 
measures of severity can neither inspire nor develope that active devo¬ 
tion for one’s immediate chief, which is the essence of discipline as 
just defined. Punishments may prevent the commission of offences, 
but are powerless to implant the desire to do well,—which is the 
essential aim of our efforts. 

Punishments, in our opinion, are included for the greater part in 
two distinct classes, corresponding to entirely different necessities. 
Firstly, there are light punishments, such as extra fatigue, or one or 
two days’ confinement, which provide a means for ''breaking in” a 
recruit and enable us to stimulate indolent natures, inclined through 
laxity to neglect part of their duty. Secondly, there are the more 
rigorous measures, including transfer to the disciplinary companies, 
and trial by court martial, which are necessary in the case of those 


*“Infantry,” by General Bounal. 



7 


refractionary individuals who have failed to respond to all appeals to 
their good sentiments, and whose grave and repeated offences must be 
the object of stern repression. 

With these exceptions, punishments may and should be reduced to a 
minimum, for it is very often expedient to show indulgence to men 
who, ordinarily perfectly amendable to discipline, have yielded to 
some short lived weakness. 

Herein lies precisely one of the greatest means of action of the 
company commander, and in this connection, nothing is more detri¬ 
mental than the schedules of punishments which commanding officers 
feel called upon to impose. 

In such matters the tact and experience of each company comman¬ 
der are the best guides. We think it our duty, however, to formulate 
the few following remarks, which may be useful to young officers. 

When one allows any offense whatsoever to pass unpunished, it is 
nevertheless essential to take notice of it, often by but a simple sign, 
without which the deliquent might think himself permitted to do the 
same thing again, or would conclude that his chief had not noticed 
it; facts which, in the long run, would be damaging to the officers 
authority. This observation must be made, should the case occur, 
in terms to make the man understand clearly, that if he is not pun¬ 
ished, it is on account of his habitual good conduct, and because it 
is considered an offense that will never be repeated. Such a method 
applied with tact, will often contribute more than a punishment to 
the better discipline of the soldier, by attaching him more firmly to 
his chief. 

The only way to obtain a faithful performance of duty is to make 
the men thoroughly understand what is required of them and to exer¬ 
cise close supervision over all details during their first days of serivce. 
This principle, so evidently necessary that it may appear useless to 
formulate it, is nevertheless very frequently neglected. Directions 
are given incompletely, without the superior’s making sure that they 
have been fully understood, or are even not given at all, and the man 
is punished because they are unexecuted or executed badly. Or again, 
after orders are properly given and well understood, supervision is not 
exercised, men relax little by little, and at last become utterly 
neglectful. Punishments rain down upon the delinquents, but it is 
too late; the evil bent is formed, and the greatest culprits are the 
chiefs, who have taken no notice of the first slips, as might have been 
done by simple observations. This explains why the best disciplined 


8 


organizations are generally those in which punishments are the least. 

These considerations are of supreme importance in the training of 
recruits during the period immediately subsequent to their enlistment. 
We shall have occasion later to recur to this matter, in speaking of 
the arrival of young recruits in the company. 

It is therefore unquestionable that punishments, considered as a 
necessary evil, play only a secondary part in the establishment and 
maintenance of discipline as it should be understood. The essen¬ 
tial elements which contribute to discipline, correspond to three 
different classes of ideas. 

(a) The ability of both officers and soldiers, the consciousness of 
which gives the man confidence in his superiors, in his comrades, 
and in himself. 

( b ) Moral education , to develop in the soldier patriotism, devo¬ 
tion to the flag, and the sense of duty. 

(c) The solicitude of the officer for the material and moral welfare of 
his men. 

Let us examine these in succession. 

(a) The ability of both officers and soldiers. —The soldier, to be truly 
the instrument of his chief, must be conscious of a superiority in the 
latter, making him worthy in all respects of the authority with which 
he is vested. An inefficient officer may by the means of punishments 
command the obedience of his men, but will never have their confi¬ 
dence. Young officers should be thoroughly convinced that, by 
developing their professional ability, they will not only qualify them¬ 
selves the better for the proper exercise of the functions of their grade, 
but will also greatly increase their control over their subordinates. 

But it is not only the instruction of the officers that is important 
from this standpoint; the instruction of the men, down to the lowest 
private, when it is well executed, induces reciprocal confidence 
among all the elements of the unit. The moral worth of each indi¬ 
vidual soldier produces the same effect. From this confidence of all 
with regard to all, there results a firm cohesion, which forms the 
most invaluable of qualities for a company in the field. 

From these qualities also springs the esprit de corps, an excellent 
thing in itself, provided that it be not exaggerated, and that the 
consciousness of the merits of one’s own arm be not combined with 
a scorn for all others. The consequences of such a condition maybe, 
as is unfortunately sometimes the case, that soldiers who are entirely 
devoted to their own officers show themselves much less disciplined 


9 

when they are placed, either alone or in small parties, under the 
orders of officers of other arms. 

The comradeship of arms, which within a few years has made such 
great progress in our corps of officers, should, to receive its full de¬ 
velopment, extend to the men. Even more, perhaps, than for the 
soldier of other arms, this quality is necessary for Engineers, sum¬ 
moned as they often are, in small detachments, to aid troops of other 
arms. Moral education, tending to develop in the man the most lofty 
sentiments, pemit us to impress upon the soldier the necessity for 
mutual devotion in all ranks of the army; and from this point of 
view its most useful complement will be found in grand and garrison 
maneuvres, and in general in all opportunities which should be made 
as numerous as possible, for combined operations of Engineer troops 
with detachments of other arms. 

(b ) Moral education .—The daily routine of duty furnishes the 
captain with the means of acting, to a certain extent, upon the moral 
well-being of his subordinates. But this educational function should 
not be confined to these limits. It is not enough, indeed to limber 
and strengthen the body of the soldier; to teach him to handle the 
arms and tools he will use in war; to obtain precision in the execu¬ 
tion of the daily routine in time of peace; it is also and especially 
necessary, as far as the nature of each individual will admit, to de¬ 
velop in him moral qualities of the very highest order, the absolute 
devotion to the fatherland and to his flag, and the spirit of abnegation 
which impels the soldier to sacrifice his life without hesitation when 
the interests of his country require. 

To this end the captain will assemble the whole company from time 
to time, and will endeavor to impress upon his men the nature and 
importance of their duty to their country. Some officers hesitate to 
do this, believing that they are not gifted with sufficient fluency of 
speech. Let such men lay aside all apprehension. It is not a 
question of delivering a philosophical dissertation, for this would be 
incomprehensible to a majority of the men. In the midst of Europe in 
arms, the necessity, more imperative than ever at the present day, 
for the complete devotion of every Frenchmen to his country should 
be briefly discussed, and an elementary history of France, and especially 
of our own times, should be given to the soldier,—facts which will 
indicate our probable enemies, which will remind him how Germany 
prepared and conducted the War of 1870, and which will impress 
upon him the obligation for all Frenchmen, if they are unwilling to 


10 


fall into decadence, to reestablish some day the integrity of the 
territory of the fatherland. 

No abstractions should be indulged in during these familiar con¬ 
versations; the anniversary of a battle taken part in by the company, 
an act of devotion performed by some soldier of the regiment, in a 
general way every incident supplying a theme for an excursion which 
may touch the heart and imagination of the soldier, will give the 
captain opportunity for a brief discussion, in which the lesson or 
example to be drawn by each man will be made plain. It is not 
necessary to be an orator to do this. In such matters the officer has 
only to let his heart speak; this will be his surest way of touching the 
hearts of his men. Let those officers try it who have not thought it 
their duty hitherto to employ this method of education. To be con¬ 
vinced of its efficacy, it will be enough to see the faces of the men 
listening to their captain, when he is explaining one of those ques¬ 
tions which mean life or death, or at least incontestable greatness 
or a irreparable decadence, to a great nation like France. 

(c) The material and moral welfare of the soldier .—The regulations 
prescribe that all officers, of all grades whatsoever, shall take the most 
solicitious concern in everything connected with the material needs 
of the soldier. In the absence of any other reason, these instructions 
would be justified by the evident fact that the physical effort that may 
be demanded of the man, and his resistance to all kinds of fatigue, 
bear a direct ratio to the extent to which the body is maintained in 
vigor and health. But this material result is not the only one obtained 
by an officer truly anxious for the welfare of his subordinates. It is 
clear, indeed, that since the physical reacts upon the moral being, the 
later will be so much the better for the soldier’s more vigorous and 
healthy condition; but there is another consequence equally deserving 
our attention. The feeling that his chief is concerned in his welfare 
exerts an excellent influence on the man’s state of mind; nothing is 
more depressing to a company on the contrary than to perceive that 
its commanding officer lacks interest in its material needs. 

The moral welfare of the soldier demands equally our care. To 
make the recruit, unaccustomed to the new element in which he has 
to live, feel on all sides the sympathy of his chiefs and of his comrades; 
to take care that the non-commissioned officers show moderation as 
well as firmness in the exercise of their authority; to repress extra¬ 
vagant language and harsh words, which merely irritate the victims 
against their superiors; and in general, to spare the soldier every 


11 


useless shock—all these contribute to the establishment of good 
discipline, and ensure the officers not only the respect and obedience, 
but also the sympathy of their subordinates. A mark of solicitude, 
a cheap attention for the officer who gives it, often ensures the deep 
attachment of the soldier concerned, during his whole service, and in 
years to come. It may be a favor to a man on the way to a sick 
parent, a visit to the hospital or to the infirmary, or even less, some 
mere trifle,[but to the soldier it is proof that his chief takes an inter¬ 
est in him. 


OFFICERS. 

A very interesting and sometimes a very delicate part of the 
functions of the company commander is his conduct toward his 
subaltern officers. 

A young officer graduates from Fontainebleau or Versailles; he 
joins the regiment with a good theoretical education, but is lacking 
the practical part of his profession. In order to become a good company 
officer, with all the authority that comes from sterling professional 
merit and a profound knowledge of men, he has much experience to 
gain. The importance, therefore, of his first impressions and the 
great influence of his first immediate chief, his first company com¬ 
mander, may be readily conceived. The greatest concern for his 
lieutenants, and particularly for the recent graduates, the first steps 
of whose official career he should guide with all possible solicitude 
and tact, should therefore be an essential duty of the captain. 

Doubtless the captain is not and should not be the only officer to 
direct and instruct the lieutenants under him; the field officers and 
the colonel especially, participate to a great and even a preponderating 
extent. We often hear, "Like colonel, like regiment," which 
amounts to saying, from our present point of view "Like colonel, like 
corps of officers." Now the young lieutenant is easily affected by 
the new environment in which he is called to live. But although 
thus limited, the captain’s task is important enough to demand his 
care. 

We have striven to prove that the greatest initiative possible 
should be left to the company commander; the same principle will 
guide this officer in his dealings with his subordinates and especially 
with his lieutenants. 

Of course the degree of initiative left to the latter should be 
carefully proportioned to their degree of experience; however, unless 


12 


the incompetency of an officer is apparent, a company commander 
should be guided by the two following rules: 

( a ) To reduce orders and instructions to the least strictly neces¬ 
sary, and for this reason, never to prescribe details that can be 
regulated by a lieutenant. 

{b ) Orders once given, to interfere in the execution thereof 
only if he foresees that the subordinate will fail to accomplish 
his object. If the result of the first measures taken will be 
merely a waste of time or some similiar inconvenience, the 
captain should allow him to continue the course adopted. 
When the work or exercise is finished, he will explain to the 
officer that another method would have effected a saving of 
time, of personnel or material. The lesson will thus be much 
more profitable. 

This rule does not apply, of course, when the company is 
taking part in combined maneuvers. 

When the captain makes a decision of importance in regard to the 
discipline, instruction, or administration of the company, it will 
generally be advantageous to acquaint his lieutenants with the reasons 
which have influenced him in making it. By taking this course, not 
only will he qualify them for their service as company commanders, but 
he will post them thoroughly as to his views on various matters of duty. 
In this way he obtains the invaluable result that, if he is absent or not 
available, these officers will act, if not exactly as he himself would 
have acted, at least in a manner generally conformable to his intentions. 

The performance of duty is more precise and enthusiastic as it is 
easier and more agreeable, and a captain who endeavors to spare his 
lieutenants useless drudgery may on this account be more exacting in 
the various duties that result in useful ends. 

We may add, that a captain really worthy of the functions devolving 
upon him will find it profitable to treat his subalterns as comrades. 
The captains who keep their lieutenants at a distance are often officers, 
who, conscious of their inferiority, fear to compromise their authority 
by allowing their subordinates to become too well acquainted with 
them. Such captains are only to be pitied; but those who for any 
other reason think it their duty to act in such a manner will surely 
gain by changing their methods. If their subordinates are taken 
further into their confidence, they will acquire more assurance in the 
routine of duty; the ideas and intentions of the chief being well 
known to all, duties will be performed more readily, without any of 


13 


the friction that too frequently occurs in the units where cohesion is 
lacking, because the chiefs have been unable to establish unrestrained 
relations with their subordinates. 

It is hardly necessary to say that the captain’s good example, the 
most scrupulous precision on his part in the performance of every 
duty, is the best means at his disposal to impress the sense of duty 
vividly upon his young subalterns. 

The instruction proper, of his lieutenants, should consist almost 
entirely of practical exercises, and the daily routine is from this 
stand-point the best of schools. There is, however, a portion of this 
instruction to which we think we should draw attention, for it is 
generally, in our opinion, not sufficiently developed. This is a 
knowledge of other arms and of general tactics. Everybody agrees that 
whether an officer belongs to the infantry, cavalry, artillery or Engi¬ 
neers, he is but half formed if he is insufficiently acquainted with the 
other arms. This knowledge is required on account of the aid that 
the various elements of the army should give each other on the 
battlefield. 

It must be observed that, except in the rare cases where they are 
utilized as infantry, the mission of Engineer troops in battle always 
consists in preparing or facilitating the action of one or several of 
the other arms. On the other hand, during an action, as we shall 
see later in speaking of technical instruction, Engineer officers should 
be at all times able to grasp the situation, in order to seize without 
hesitation the opportunities that enable them to employ, on thfeir own 
initiative, the personnel under their orders. We may conclude from 
these two considerations, especially if we bear in mind that no inter¬ 
mediary exists between the division commander and the captain of 
the divisional Engineer company, that, of all arms, the Engineers 
stand most in need of thorough instruction, both as regards tactics* 
in general, and the special tactics of each arm and particularly of the 
infantry and artillery. 

Besides, if we may judge from what happens ordinarily during 
grand maneuvers, the captain of the divisional company will as a rule 
accompany the division commander in the field, and the company 
may be left in command of a low ranking lieutenant. This will 
cause no great trouble as long as the company has nothing to do but 
to march in its place in the column. But if an action becomes im¬ 
minent, and the captain has been sent on a reconnaissance or is 
prevented by some other reason from immediately rejoining his 


14 


company, the task of guiding the company in the midst of troops of 
all arms, and of making important decisions on points that come up 
from time to time, will fall on the lieutenant. 

One can not, therefore, begin too soon to develop practically, as far 
as possible, the tactical instruction of young officers. Reconnais¬ 
sances, exercises on the map with both sides represented, maneuvers 
of all sorts, will, for this reason be of the greatest profit to them. 

THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. 

The part played by the sergeants of a company is of great impor¬ 
tance. They are the indispensable auxiliaries of the officers in all 
the details of military duty, and its proper execution is thus dependent, 
in great part, on their efficiency. 

In permanent contact with the men, they exercise an immediate 
influence over them; their esprit de corps , and their manner of perform¬ 
ing their duty, has consequently, a considerable effect on the company 
as a whole, and the greatest care of the captain should be to have a 
good body of non-commissioned officers. The adoption of the three- 
year service, by bringing about a much more frequent renewal of this 
grade, has rendered the task of the company commander much more 
difficult. Formerly, when the five-year service was in force, each 
year, at the release of a class, about one-third of the non-coms were 
lost. Those who remained maintained the traditions, and the newly 
promoted men formed themselves, so to speak, on their older 
comrades. It is no longer the same. Each year, in September, the 
companies have their staff of sergeants entirely renewed, with the 
exception of the first sergeant and one, or rarely, two reenlisted ser¬ 
geants, with also possibly a sergeant who was not discharged, having 
been promoted to this grade before two years service, or one from the 
men enlisted for four years. The sergeants coming under these last two 
heads are not numerous in Engineer regiments. The new sergeants 
are imbued with a spirit and bring into the company habits which are 
not those of their new surroundings. This system brings about 
critical periods which should demand all the attention of the captain. 

One way of reducing this inconvenience, is to require that a man 
who has served in the company as a corporal be assigned to it as a 
sergeant. By taking care in the selection, one wfill thus have, with 
the reenlisted men who generally remain, a nucleus that will greatly 
facilitate the breaking in of the newly promoted men from other 
companies. 


15 


It is also very advantageous in this connection—but this is the 
colonel’s business to see that the vacancies among the sergeants 
which are produced at the release of the class, are not all filled at 
once; but by means of two seperate promotions, one at the end of 
September, the other a few days before the arrival of the recruits. 

Upon receiving his new sergeants, the captain should explain 
clearly the way in which he desires their duties performed. It is 
erroneous to believe that the regulations indicate the duties of each 
grade so clearly as to dispense with this. The young sergeants need 
a guide. It is also clear, that in a company, all those who exercise 
any authority whatever, should do so in conformity with the views 
of the captain, and it would be improper, from this standpoint, to 
leave the new sergeants to their own devices. 

It is especially necessary to make them understand properly, from 
the day of their arrival in the company, that the actual execution of 
the details of the military duty rests almost exclusively on them, and 
to inspire in them the greatest horror of lying, a vice unworthy of a 
soldier whatever his grade, and one to be combatted by every possible 
means. In return they should be shown such confidence as will raise 
them in their own estimation. They will thus acquire, of themselves, 
the habit of doing their duty conscientiously even in the absence of 
their officers, and under circumstances which render the detection of 
wrong-doing impossible. A few remarks of interest, properly shown, 
will succeed in making of the new sergeants subordinates who are 
entirely devoted to their captain. Let there be added to this a dis¬ 
creet supervision, at first, of the details of their duties and a firm yet 
kindly correction of the usual trifling failings; and you will have at 
the end of two or three months sergeants who, with few exceptions, 
will be entirely competent in the performance of the duties which 
have devolved upon them, and valuable assistants to their officers. 

Officers will, of course, never intrude upon the just authority of 
their sergeants. The attention of the lieutenants should be specially 
called to this point. On the contrary, in proportion as they acquire 
experience, the sergeants will be left more and more to themselves and 
will be intrusted with tasks a little beyond those which properly 
belong to their grade; the double advantage will thus be obtained of 
giving them greater prestige in the eyes of the company and preparing 
them to replace their officers in case of need. 

It must be recognized that many captains who complain of the 
inefficiency of their sergeants have only to examine their own 


16 


consciences. If they had not neglected the instruction of the sergeants 
at first, and had not waited until the effects of the bad habits were 
felt before interfering to correct them, but, on the contrary, had seized 
every occasion to develop the self-reliance and initiative of these 
men, they would find that their indifferent sergeants would have made 
very fit non-commissioned officers. Their restricted length of service 
does not certainly facilitate the task of the company commander, but 
this is the more reason for devoting every care to it. The way in 
which the sergeants perform their duties depends upon the manner 
in which they have been brought up by their captain; and it may 
truly be said that the quality of the sergeants of a company and the 
spirit which animates them is the true test of the ability of the 
officer in command. 

THE CORPORALS. 

Although low in rank, the grade of corporal is none the less one of 
the most difficult to fill properly. The corporal has not had ordinarily, 
enough experience, to teach it to his subordinates. The life in 
common with the latter leads almost necessarily to a familiarity that 
is not conducive to increasing his authority. It may even be said 
that a corporal depends, to a certain extent, on the men of his squad, 
for, as his duties are numerous, he is often obliged to appeal to their 
good-will to prepare his accoutrements, clean his arms, etc. In addi¬ 
tion it sometimes unfortunately happens that the corporal may get 
into difficulty with the sergeants, and may find that instead of aiding 
him in the performance of his duty they are shouldering on him a 
part of theirs. One may easily appreciate, therefore, how thankless 
the duties of the corporal may be. In some cases his duties are 
laborious; he is responsible to many superiors, and, in spite of his 
best efforts, he does not succeed in satisfying all. 

The captain has, therefore, many reasons for being very solicitious 
in regard to his corporals. He should aid' them in their inexperience 
by his advice, supervise as closely as possible the discipline of the 
squads, and facilitate them in the performance of their duties as far 
as lies in his power. As almost all of them are destined to become 
sergeants, he will attach the greatest importance to their military and 
technical training. 

This question of promotion from the lower grades leads us to say 
a word concerning the special "platoons of instruction" which are 
still in use in the Engineer regiments. A few days after joining, the 


17 


recruits are examined in the companies with regard to primary in¬ 
struction, where they are given a dictation exercise and two or three 
problems; those who come out the best are nominated for the "platoon 
of special instructon. ” We may remark that this assignment is made 
solely in accordance with the results of the primary examination as 
the men have been in the service too short a time for their captain 
to be able to appreciate them from any other standpoint. 

From this time on they are practically out of the company. If, in 
some cases, their theoretical training may be improved by this course 
of instruction, their practical and military training certainly suffers. 

Those who are not extraordinarily awkward at drill, or of notoriously 
bad conduct, or who have not a particularly poor memory complete 
the course in the instructional platoon without mishap. Each is then 
given his relative number, depending principally on the facility with 
which he has learned the "letter of the theory.” 

With rare exceptions, promotions of the "candidates” to the grade 
of corporal are made in the order of their arrangement in the platoon 
of instruction. 

The result of this system is that the candidates are selected for 
instruction, classified in the platoon, and finally promoted,all according 
to their facility in memorizing theoretical instruction. We need 
not point out the fact that such a system is not the one to secure 
practical results. 

What precedes, applies to the instructional platoon of the candidates 
for corporals. The same difficulties are found in that of the lance 
sergeants; with this extenuation however, that as the non-coms who 
form part of it have had some service, it is possible to know more of 
their militiary qualities. Nevertheless, here again memory plays the 
principal part. The conclusion must be reached that the candidates 
for corporals and sergeants should be instructed with their companies 
in the same manner as the other men. There is, besides, no reason why 
the system that is recognized by the most competent military author¬ 
ities as the best for infantry should not also be best for the Engineers. 
Last of all, it may be stated that we have never seen instructional 
platoons organized except for military instruction, properly so called, 
everything that relates to technical works being taught in the company 
to all the men whether they are, or are not to receive advancement. 

The almost necessary result of instructing candidates for corporals 
and sergeants in their own company is that they are promoted in their 
own organization. It has been said that the result of this course 


18 


might be that occasionally, at least, some of the non-commissioned 
officers would not have enough authority over their former comrades. 

This difficulty should not be exaggerated. When it exists, it is 
more than balanced by several advantages. In the first place, the 
captain, knowing that he is preparing his own sergeants and corporals, 
will exercise much more care in the instruction of the men who by 
their character and service appear apt to become good non-commis¬ 
sioned officers, with real authority over their men. You will never 
see a company commander recommending a worthless corporal for 
a sergeancy with the sole object of getting rid of him, as sometimes 
happens when the system of changing newly promoted men from one 
unit to another is in force. Last of all, the difficulty previously 
referred to, that results from replacing almost all the lower non-com¬ 
missioned officers when a class is released will be for the greater part 
avoided.' 1 ' 

The newly promoted men remaining in surroundings which are 
familiar to them, and well acquainted with the ideas of their captain, 
will have an infinitely easier apprenticeship than they would if they 
changed companies. 

We may say, moreover, that we have requested and obtained several 
times, in the company which we had the honor of commanding, the 
promotion of privates of the company in place of lance corporals or 
sergeants; we have never remarked that they had less authority over 
the men than their comrades who came from other companies. 

The objection may be raised that one does not find in all organiza¬ 
tions the non-commissioned officers to properly carry on the instruction 
of candidates for corporals and sergeants, but this does not seem an 
insurmountable obstacle. It would doubtless result in more work, 
principally for the lieutenants and sergeants, but this is nothing 
when we consider the advantages that result from instruction carried 
on in the company, as compared with that given in platoons of 
instruction. . * 

THE MEN. 

As far as regards discipline, we have set forth almost all that we 
have to say concerning the men. We will have occasion to complete 

*1. We may remark, that when necessary, it is always possible to get over this 
difficulty by transferring from another company such non-commissioned officers as 
would apparently be benefitted by a change. 

2. What we have said of sergeants in this connection applies equally to corporals. 
Even if they are not all promoted sergeants on the departure of a class, the two or 
three that are left are usually of indifferent efficiency, or very low in rank. 



19 


our remarks later, in speaking of military and technical instruction. 
We wish here only to draw attention to the circumstances surrounding 
the recruit on joining. 

A few days before the arrival of the recruits, the captain should 
assemble the non-commissioned officers of the company, in order to 
instruct them in regard to the way that he intends the recruits 
should be treated during the first days of their service with the colors. 

The young men that we receive are almost always animated, on 
their arrival, with a desire to do well. Many of them feel an appre¬ 
hension that paralvses the more timid, but this should not be taken 
for ill -wi 11. R igorous methods should therefore, except in entirely 
exceptional cases,he strictly forbidden; the non-commissioned officers, 
and particularly the corporals in command of squads, should rival one 
another in their zeal to teach the recruits the various details of their 
daily duty; at drill, the instructors should avoid harshness. 

It is only after some time, when the recruits are accustomed to 
their new duties, that the faults really due to laziness or ill-will can 
be picked out; then only after one or two infractions have been over¬ 
looked, will it be proper to inflict a few slight punishments, which 
will usually suffice to bring the man back to the proper path. 

A thing to be closely looked after is the assignment to fatigue 
duty. There are often, in the contingent assigned to a company, one 
or two recuits particularly lacking in intelligence. Although, in 
the beginning at least, they do not show ill-will in the preformance 
of their duty, yet they find themselves picked out and taken in hand by 
the inferior non-commissioned officers. If care is not taken, these 
men will be placed on extra fatigue without the knowledge of their 
officers. Not having time to clean their own arms and equipments, 
they are punished for slovenliness. They become irritated and end 
by committing an act of insubordination, for which they are severely 
punished. Their morale is completely demoralized by the bad char¬ 
acters which they meet in the guard-house. They come out of the 
guard-house worse than they entered. From this time forward they 
are on the downward path, and perhaps nothing will stop them. The 
captain should therefore watch closely those men who are pointed 
out to him during the beginning of their service with the colors as 
being particularly difficult to train. In addition, he will do well to 
maintain a close supervision over fatigue duty, and frequently verify 
the fatigue details. 

We therefore see that it is important that the captain should have 


20 


a personal knowledge of his recruits as soon as possible after they 
join. 

For this purpose, immediately on their arrival he will look them 
over individually, will question them concerning their occupations in 
civil life, the condition of their family, etc., and will carefully enter 
all this information in a note-book, to which other information may 
be added later, as he knows them better. This book will furnish data 
that the company commander will find useful in many circumstances, 
such as applications for leaves of absence requested because the soldier 
must support his family, must be present at harvesting, etc. 

This method of procedure is advantageous from another point of 
view. The recruit sees in it the interest that his captain takes in 
him, and from the beginning, does not look upon him as a stranger. 
This feeling stimulates his good-will and suppresses any feeling of 
apprehension that would interfere with his usefulness. 

We may sum up these remarks, therefore, by stating that the duties 
of the captain should be exercised with great firmness, care, and 
kindness. 

Details vary, and should vary with the chief who employs them as 
well as with the men to whom they are applied; and the method which 
succeeds in one case may not be suitable in another. We need not 
consider the three attributes above indicated as any the less necessary. 
The individual temperament of each captain will merely give predomi¬ 
nance to one, without ever allowing him to suppress any of the three 
completely, if he desires to be sure of obtaining everywhere, and under 
all circumstances, the best possible result from the men the country 
has entrusted to him. 


PART IL 


INSTRUCTION. 

All officers who, during the past few years, have been engaged in 
the instruction of Engineer troops, can testify how difficult, not to say 
how impossible, it sometimes is to give sufficient time to each of the 
different branches, both military and technical, which make up this 
instruction. Such a situation is due to several causes, to remove 
which is not within the sphere of the company commanders; they 
can only endeavor, by increased zeal and activity, to diminish the 
resulting ill effects. 

However, on account of the extreme importance of this question, 
and although it is but indirectly related to the chief object of our 
paper, we have thought best to set forth certain considerations, which 
for the sake of clearness we have relegated to an appendix at the end 
of the present essay. We shall then confine ourselves in the following 
chapter to a few remarks, which seem to us likely to be of interest 
to our young comrades entrusted with the command of companies. 

Since the point to be determined is the relative importance to be 
given to a branch of instruction or to some part of it, we must suppose 
that the company commanders are left free, as far as practicable, to 
regulate for themselves the employment of-the time, under the super¬ 
vision of the battalion commander. They will be governed by the 
two following conditions: 

(1) To finish the different parts of the course at the times fixed 
by the commanding officer. 

(2) To have the company ready for service as soon after the 
recruits have joined as is possible. 

MILITARY INSTRUCTION. 

DRILL REGULATIONS. 

Existing orders provide that the infantry drill regulations apply to 
Engineer troops. It is quite certain however, that the latter, by reason 


22 


of the exigencies of their special instruction, cannot study or practice 
these regulations to the same extent as the arm for which they are 
more particularly intended. This besides, would be useless, for 
when in rare cases Engineers are employed as infantry, they are so 
employed under very special conditions which do not require in the 
Engineer soldier all the qualities that a good infantryman should 
possess. 

For the details of this instruction we cannot do better than refer 
our comrades to the remarkable work of General Bonnal. Of course, 
we must take into consideration the fact that it is almost impossible 
for Engineer troops to engage in certain exercises, such as boxing and 
single-stick, which doubtless would be to their profit, but which must 
yield precedence to other branches of instruction much more impor¬ 
tant to the Engineer arm. However, we must avoid falling into 
exaggerated ideas, and considering everything in the way of gymnastics 
to be useless to the Engineer. Running and jumping, in particular, 
might be practiced to a greater extent than is usually the case. 

The necessity of recurring frequently to individual instruction 
and to exercises in detail is perhaps greater in the Engineers than in 
any other arm. The goings and comings on the engineer drill 
ground, where it is impossible to exact absolute and continual cor¬ 
rectness from men often burdened with the most various loads, rapidly 
gives to the men, if one does not look out for it, a habit of carelessness 
most prejudicial to the proper execution of movements when close 
formations are resumed. It is then indispensable, over and above 
the drills properly so called, to take the men in hand whenever the 
occasion arises. 

FIELD DUTIES. 

In the instruction in field exercises, the dispositions which must 
be taken by a company or smaller detachment to protect itself when 
acting alone, must frequently be studied. The case of the company 
employed as a unit in a complete system of outposts must indeed be 
regarded as quite abnormal, while a detachment of Engineers may 
often be required to provide for its own security in cantonment or 
bivouac, when with a special mission in view, it is employed in front 
or on the flank of the army, covered at most by a few small bodies of 
cavalry. 

As regards the assembly, it is essential that the company be well 
trained to form in the minimum time without drum or bugle. A 


23 


company of Engineers is in camp in a locality also occupied by bodies 
of other arms. In the middle of the night its commander receives 
orders to set out immediately with his company to make a demolition, 
repair a crossing, etc. The company or the detachment must, in this 
case, be able to assemble rapidly, and to do this in silence so as to 
disturb in no way the rest of the other troops. To this end the 
sentinels will make themselves familiar with the quarters of the 
officers and the non-commissioned officers, so as to be able to waken 
them in the night without any groping about. The sergeants for 
their part, will know exactly where the chiefs of squads sleep, and the 
latter the sleeping places of their men. In drills of this nature the 
non-commissioned officers must be trained to arrive at the place of 
assembly with their half-sections or squads complete; and must be 
made to understand that a sergeant or corporal does not fully perform 
his duty in reporting to the captain the absence of such or such a man ; 
he must first have done everything in his power to find the man. 
Whenever the company is required to pass the night out of barracks 
these measures will be strictly enforced, so that everyone may become 
thoroughly accustomed to them. 


MARCHING. 


The Engineers must be as well trained in marching as the infantry. 
They must always keep up with the infantry columns to which they 
are attached, and must sometimes be able to make twice the distance 
of an ordinary march, and still arrive in a condition to begin work. 

This training cannot be obtained by means of marches performed 
once a week, or once a forthnight. Such exercises, so spaced, will 
only enable a previously trained company to keep in marching trim. 

To accomplish the desired result, the company should make, 
consecutively—excepting necessary days of rest—eight or ten marches 
of increasing length. Two weeks may be given to this purpose, 
which will be utilized in the following manner: 


FIRST WEEK. 
Monday, 15 km. (9 miles.) 
Tuesday, 18 km. (11 miles.) 
Wednesday, rest. 

Thursday, 18 km. (11 miles.) 
Friday, 20 km. (12 miles.) 
Saturday, 22 km. (14 miles.) 
Sunday, rest. 


SECOND WEEK. 
Monday, 22 km. (14 miles.) 
Tuesday, 25 km. (16 miles.) 
Wednesday, 25 km. (16 miles.) 
Thursday, rest. 

Friday, 30 km. (19 miles.) 
Saturday, 35 km. (22 miles.) 
Sundav. resst. 


24 


These practice marches are preferably made at the end of winter, 
between the end of recruit instruction and the beginning of the season 
on the engineer drill-ground. At this time the young soldiers are 
under better control than at any other, and consequently no time is 
more favorable for accustoming the company to march in the best 
order compatible with the condition of the road and the state of the 
weather. This instruction is of the greatest importance, and it may 
be said that the appearance of a company on the march when it has 
just made 30 km. in bad weather or over a cut-up road, is one of the 
best criterions of its instruction, and even of its morale. 

Taking this view, some officers advocate the use of the cadenced 
step; and in certain army corps the route step has been forbidden 
except in crossing fields. There has been considerable discussion 
on this question. While the cadenced step gives a fine appearance 
to the company on the march, and permits distances to be exactly 
maintained, yet it causes great fatigue to men of exceptional confor¬ 
mation, in all cases, and to the whole company on roads that are not 
perfectly smooth. 

On the other hand, it will be observed that after a few consecutive 
marches the men at a route step will plant their feet—the right or 
left indifferently—at very nearly the same time. This no doubt 
results from the fact that, as they are accustomed to the cadenced step 
they have a tendency to plant their feet at the familiar tread of the 
company. As a consequence of this fact, each man, in order to march 
more easily, takes the step from the man in front of him. It may be 
said that after three or four consecutive marches, the company at route 
step will take a step that differs from the cadenced step only in the fact 
that it changes from section to section, and even in the sections them¬ 
selves. These changes are the result of the small breaks caused by 
trifling irregularities in the road, on account of which one sees the 
men change step frequently when marching at the cadenced step. 

We may therefore conclude that while there are objections to 
employing the cadenced step for the whole company, and imposing it 
on all the men, yet it is most advantageous to require the sections to 
march in cadence, with the understanding that the men who cannot 
conform to the step without fatigue shall be permitted to take the 
route step. Under these conditions the cadenced step, far from being 
an inconvenience to the soldier, facilitates the march, and permits as 
far as possible the preservation of the alignment by ranks and files, 
which must be observed whenever the state of the road does not require 


25 


that the men be allowed to choose at will the best paths, or the 
temperature does not necessitate increased intervals. 

If the guide takes a regular step, and if he is careful not to increase 
the gait on descents, nor to decrease it on ascents, we reduce to a 
minimum the lengthening out of the column and the resulting 
fluctuations. These fluctuations are the most fatiguing element of 
a march over good roads in ordinary temperatures. 

We must remark on the advisability of conducting these field 
exercises by company, and not by battalion, or by regiment, as is some¬ 
times done. Except for the very rare cases when the three companies 
of an army corps are united for some special duty, the Engineer 
troops in campaign will operate by companies. It is essential that 
the captains become accustomed to acting on their own responsibility, 
without other instructions than the very general ones which will be 
received from their immediate superior authorities, and to regulating 
without hesitation a number of details which, in an infantry 
regiment, fall to the colonel or the major. 

TARGET PRACTICE. 

Without having the same importance as for infantry, target practice 
nevertheless constitutes one of the essential portions of the instruc¬ 
tion of Engineer troops. 

It must first be observed that in the instruction of the marksman, 
whether he be an Engineer or infantryman, two very distinct objects 
are contemplated: 

1st. To teach the man skill at target practice,—in other words, 
to make him a good shot on the range. 

2d. By frequently repeated drills, to so accustom him to the 
motions of loading and aiming, that they become instinctive, and are 
correctly executed even at short range, in spite of the excitement 
caused by the proximity of the enemy. It is certain, indeed, that as 
the distance between the hostile forces diminishes, the number of 
men who are really in condition to take careful aim becomes less 
and less; at the moment for decisive fire action, all that can be 
expected of them is to shoot into the crowd. 

Is one justified then in saying that skill in target practice is 
useless? Certainly not. The infantry especially, in order to embar¬ 
rass the service of the hostile batteries, may have need of carefully 
aimed fire, delivered from such a range that the excitment experienced 
by the best shots, who will be employed in such a case, will have 


26 


little effect on their marksmanship. Again, on the defensive, when 
fire is opened at long range, many men will be able to use the skill 
which they have acquired at target practice. But there is another 
reason which by itself would justify the importance usually attached 
to target practice, and this is that when a man shoots well, he acquires 
a confidence in his weapon that gives him confidence in himself. 

As regards Engineer troops, it is to be observed that they will fire 
only when they are immediately threatened by the enemy, or in an 
emergency in default of infantry. It would seem that the Engineers 
will seldom fire at long ranges, such as 800 to 1,000 meters; but 
that their fire will be limited to short ranges. 

It is therefore important, for the reasons given, to have them execute 
frequently the motions of loading and firing. To this end, every 
time that the company, for any reason whatever, falls in under arms, 
it should be put through the motions of a few volleys and of firing at 
will. In any case, these exercises, which take up very little time, 
should be conducted not less than three times per week. 

As to target practice, the course laid down in the firing regulations, 
when properly applied, gives most of the men sufficient skill in this 
direction. However, it is usually found that some of the men are 
far from proficient after considerable practice. In some cases this 
results from defective vision, which must be corrected by suitable 
glasses. In others it is caused by the men jerking their shoulders, or 
fingers, as is indicated in Article IV of the firing regulations. The 
regulations prescribe the means for remedying such defects. But 
the most frequent cause for the poor shooting is that the arms or eyes 
of the men are fatigued before they have succeeded in directing the 
line of sight on the object. It is then impossible for them to take 
proper aim, try as they will, and in despair of success they pull the 
trigger almost at random. It is obvious what the result of such firing 
must be. For such men, the majority of the bad shots, there is a 
simple and effective remedy. It is a method used by many good shots 
to improve their aim. It consists merely in practicing a few minutes 
each day in aiming at any definite object, and holding the sights on 
the mark as long as possible. After a few days of this practice a 
great improvement will be noticed, even in men who previously could 
not hit the target at all. 

In addition to the instruction of the men, there is the instruction 
of the officers. For the infantry at least, this is the more important 
of the two. It comprises the estimation of distances, the employment 


27 


of different kinds of fire, and the regulation and control of the firing. 
As Engineer troops will nearly always fire at short ranges, the in¬ 
struction of Engineer officers in fire control is much simplified. 

It must not be concluded, however, that this instruction may be 
completely neglected. 

TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION. 

As regards the details of instruction in sapping, mining, and bridge 
building, we have no remarks to make; we shall only say a few words 
on the fortification of the battle-field and on technical instruction in 
winter. 

FORTIFICATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD. 

Field works may be divided into two distinct classes; the first 
includes the more or less deliberate works, constructed in the mere 
presence of the enemy, in the organization of an important defensive 
position; the second includes those that must be executed with the 
utmost rapidity—sometimes in a few minutes—under the pressure of 
an imminent attack. Examples of the latter class are the organiza¬ 
tion of a point of support just occupied by the advance guard, or 
clearing a road for a column about to attack, etc. 

The construction of works of the first class can always be accom¬ 
plished by ordinary laborers, if they are relieved sufficiently often. 
Those of the second class, on the contrary, must be rapidly laid out, 
quickly commenced, and vigorously prosecuted. This can be accom¬ 
plished only by specially trained troops. 

In the first class of works, therefore, the working parties should 
be drawn from the infantry, except for those portions of. the work for 
the execution of which the trained personnel or the special equipment 
of Engineer troops is necessary. Such a disposition is, moreover, 
usually unavoidable, for there are not enough Engineer troops to 
completely prepare the defensive positions for a large force. It 
would even appear preferable to spare the Engineers in such work, 
in order to avoid exhausting their energy before the battle begins, 
and to save them for the many tasks that fall to them after it has 
begun. 

When the battle has commenced—and especially if the action is 
an offensive one—the infantry will have other things to do. They 
will be on the firing line, or massed for an attack, or maneuvering 
for their positions on the battlefield. The work that circumstances 


28 


from time to time require, in the course of the action, will fall 
almost exclusively on the Engineers. The companies with corps 
headquarters will be charged with the work of general importance to 
the army corps, such as the preparation of positions for a retreat, the 
destruction of important structures, etc. The divisional companies, 
closely accompanying the infantry, will have to fortify the points of 
support seized by the advance guard, and those which the infantry 
takes possession of in the preliminary combat; open roads to facilitate 
the movements of infantry and artillery; and execute the other work 
required on the field of battle. 

Above all, it will be in case of an attack from an unexpected 
quarter that the greatest efforts will be required of the Engineer 
troops. If these are well trained and well commanded, they may in 
a few minutes organize a point of support which, weak as it may be, 
will perhaps enable the few men on the ground to gain the necessary 
time for bringing up the reserves. The captains must usually in 
such cases act on their own responsibility, without waiting orders, 
which if they come at all, will almost always come too late. 

In order that this duty may be properly preformed, Engineer officers 
should be, as far as possible, informed of the intentions of the Com¬ 
manding General. They must attentively follow the phases of the 
combat, and should be sufficiently versed in tactics to understand the 
situations that successively present themselves. They should possess 
the initiative to unhesitatingly adopt on their own responsibility the 
measures that the circumstances require. Finally they should have 
the professional training to make the best use in the least time of 
the resources at their disposal. 

As regards the enlisted men, they must be well trained in earth 
work, both in order that they mav do the work rapidly, and also that 
they may have the endurance to repeat this effort several times in the 
course of a day. It is very necessary that they be trained in rapidlv 
commencing a field work. While an officer is tracing the work, the 
men should be receiving their tools. They are then rapidly posted 
and immediately begin work. They must be taught, in proper cases, 
to modify the regular profiles, so as to get the necessary earth with 
the least labor, the only dimension of the parapet that cannot be 
deviated from being the thickness of the parapet, which should not 
be reduced below 80 cm. (30 inches). Under this system of instruc¬ 
tion, the results obtained with a well drilled company are surprising. 


29 


THE WINTER SEASON. 

A few years ago, the interval between the date that the new soldier 
joined and the end of March, was devoted only to their military 
instruction. It now includes a number of technical drills (about 
two per week) intended to give the recruit some notion of the special 
duties of the arm, with a view to the possibilities of a mobilization 
in the spring. We thus have at our disposal thirty drills, and must 
determine what use to make of them. 

The most apparent solution is to divide the time between the 
different branches of instruction in proportion to the total number of 
drills which each would require in the course of a year; in order to 
give each recruit some facility in performing all the tasks which mav 
fall to an Engineer soldier in the course of a campaign. 

But such a result appears very difficult to attain. It can scarcely 
be assumed,for example, that a young recruit who has attended two 
or three boat drills in the Arras bridge school, can fill his place in 
the anchor and boat detachment of a company throwing a ponton 
bridge over the Rhine, or even over a much less rapid stream. 

It does not appear, however, that the attainment of this result is 
indispensable. The essential thing is to have all the companies con¬ 
stantly ready for mobilization—that is to say, in a condition to execute 
all the work that may fall to an Engineer company in the course of 
a campaign. If they cannot be constantly ready for mobilization, 
every effort should be made to reduce as far as possible the period 
during which they are not ready. 

Let us take for example the ponton drill, and consider the case of 
a company whose recruits have two or three months service. We 
leave out the sergeants and corporals, who, if they have been well 
instructed, should be ready to perform all the duties of their grade. 

Let us suppose that a mobilization occurs, and that the company 
mobilizes on its peace footing, 80 enlisted men, of whom 40 are 
recruits. What instruction should the latter have received in order 
that the company may build, under normal conditions, a bridge by 
successive pontons, without the assistance of the reservists? 

Among the 40 old soldiers, the 20 best instructed in boat drill will 
be selected to form the anchor and boat detachment; the 20 others 
will compose the lashing detachment. The new soldiers should be 
competent to build the abutments, place the side rails, and, with a 
few auxiliaries, carry the balk and chess. 


30 


They may, besides, receive the necessary instruction for such work 
on any pond or water-course, the swiftness of the current having, in 
respect to this, no importance. It will likewise be advantageous to 
drill a certain number of them in lashing, in order to provide for a 
possible shortage in the old soldiers, who should in every case furnish 
the anchor and boat detachment complete. 

Therefore, to confine ourselves to this one example, we may ask 
whether to prepare Engineer troops for war, it would not be better 
to teach each man thoroughly a portion only of the course of instruc¬ 
tion, that he may fill a few specified positions, instead of instructing 
all the recruits uniformity during the winter season, with a view to 
giving them all a smattering of all their duties. The instruction 
of the men may be completed during the summer season, by taking 
them successively through all the duties. 

Carrying out the same idea, it does not appear necessary to give to 
the new soldiers, during the winter, any information on the use of 
explosives. The company should always have a sufficient number of 
trained men to execute such work. 

There are some drills, however, in which every enlisted man should 
be instructed. In the category, are the execution of earth work, and 
field fortification. Each enlisted man has a tool for such work, in 
the same way that each infantryman has his rifle, and each cavalryman 
his horse. That he may do this work properly, he must be drilled 
in the defensive organization of positions, the improvement of the 
natural features of the ground, in the construction of bridges over 
small streams and ditches, and in the execution of all the small tasks 
that fall to the Engineers on the field of battle. Above all, he must 
be well drilled in earth work. 

What after all, distinguishes an Engineer company from any 
infantrv company, as regards proficiency in the construction of field¬ 
works—this term being taken in its widest sense? Two very different 
things. First; special technical instruction, comprising branches in 
which the infantry are untrained. Second; training in earth-work, 
which enables them to do more work in a given time, and above all 
to keep on working for such long periods as could not be attained 
by a man who knows how to use his tool but is not exercised in their 
use. 

The necessity for training all Engineer soldiers as skillful and 
vigorous excavators, is very apparent when one studies closely the 


31 


duties of Engineer troops on the battlefield, as we have endeavored 
to do in the case of field fortifications. 

The recruits should, therefore, be drilled in earth-work at as early 
a date as is possible. Too much attention should not be paid to 
tracing and profiling, but as much digging as is possible should be 
done. One or two drills should be devoted to drill in rapidly com¬ 
mencing work. 

To resume, there might be during the winter season two or three 
bridge drills under the conditions above indicated. The rest of the 
time would be given to earth-work and to field-works. As for all 
other tasks which would fall upon the Engineers in the field, it 
would seem that the company could always acquit itself satisfactorily, 
without requiring the recruits to serve except as combatants or work¬ 
men, if account is taken in regulating the details of instruction 
during the summer season of the vacancies annually produced by the 
expiration of enlistments. 


* 



APPENDIX. 


We have alluded several times in the course of the article to the limit¬ 
ed time available for the instruction of Engineer troops. Whatever the 
zeal and devotion of the officers, and however much the work required 
of the men, it is feared that this difficulty cannot be completely obviated. 

Is it possible to apply a truly efficacious remedy to the situation, by 
attacking directly the causes of its existence? 

The study of such a question so surpasses our ability that we would 
hesitate to attack it, if we did not consider it an imperative duty for every 
officer to contribute to the best of his power, however little those powers 
may be, to the progress which should be the constant law of our military 
organization. 

Two principal causes tend to reduce the time available for instruction: 

1st. The great number of special duty men which the companies 
furnish. 

2d. The multiplicity of the duties of the arm. 

The first of these causes has two equally regrettable results: 

(a) By considerably reducing the number of men available for work 
and drill, it renders impossible the execution by company of certain drills 
that require a definite number of men; such as for example, ponton bridge 
construction. Recourse must be had to drill companies, a proceeding 
which furnishes a poor means for individual instruction, although it per¬ 
fects, in some cases, the instruction of the organization. 

( b) It reduces the length of time available for instruction. Almost 
all the men are on special duty at the end of the first year, some even as 
soon as their purely military instruction is completed. 

It may truthfully be said, therefore, that there is only a single year, or 
rather ten months, available for the instruction of the men, and that this 
applies to men serving for three years as much as to those serving but one. 
All Engineer officers who have been on duty with Engineer regiments 
will appreciate the difficulties which are experienced in giving sufficient 
time to every part of the instruction in so short a period. 



33 


It does not seem that the situation can be sensibly modified, except by 
a radical change in our military organization. For several years, indeed, 
the inspectors-general, corps commanders, etc., have made an effort to re¬ 
duce the number of clerks. The results obtained are certainly appreciable, 
but it must be admitted that nothing much remains to be done in this 
direction and that the small number of men which might perhaps be 
returned to the ranks, would scarcely work any change in the present 
state of affairs. 

Let us then turn to the various duties of the arm. 

These duties, numerous in the past, have recently been still futher in¬ 
creased when the regiments of pontoniers were abolished, and the ponton 
work was given to the Engineers. The ponton drill appreciably reduces 
the time which can be given to other drills. 

It may then be asked whether all the Engineer troops, except the railroad 
and balloon regiments, should be drilled in ponton building, or whether 
it would not be preferable to specialize some of the companies in this 
duty, as for example the corps companies, leaving the divisional and garri¬ 
son companies to receive the same instruction as in the past. 

Up to the present time the former system has been followed, except as 
far as concerns the assignment of companies on mobilization. 

There has been no increase in the enlisted strength of the Engineer 
troops to correspond with the increase in their duties. As the number 
of companies remains about the same, it would appear most difficult to 
assign a sufficient number of them to the new work without encroaching 
on the other duties of the arm. 

There are other difficuties to be confronted. The old Engineer garri¬ 
sons—Arras, Grenoble, Montpellier, Versailles—were chosen at a time 
when there was ho thought of ponton duty for this arm. The result is 
that the troops must be moved and sent to large streams, where the breadth 
and rapidity of current will permit them to perfect the instruction that 
can only be outlined at their garrisons. 

Such a proceeding requires considerable time, to the detriment of other 
important branches, which cannot be neglected, as they constitute an es¬ 
sential part of the instruction of some companies. A case in point is the 
instruction of the fortress companies in saps and mines. The school of 
mines requires, especially, considerable time for its proper treatment, so 
that it is very difficult to make an accomplished miner and a well drilled 
pontonier out of the same Engineer soldier in three years. 

At first sight specialization would seem to be a remedy for the situation. 
The specialization might be applied to the companies as a whole, or to the 


34 


soldiers in the company. The result would be the same—the number of 
subjects to be taught each soldier would be reduced, and more time could 
be devoted to instruction in the subjects taken up. 

We propose, therefore, in the remainder of our remarks to consider 
whether this measure appears compatible with the proper preparation of 
Engineer troops for war, and in the case of the affirmative, whether it 
should be applied to individual men or to organizations, and under what 
conditions. 

SAPS AND MINES. 

Amongst the duties of Engineer troops, saps and mines were formerly 
the most important, as is shown by the name “sapper and miner.” At 
present the employment of these works has been considerably modified, 
and has sensibly diminished, at least in the regular and almost rigid forms 
formerly affected. Again, the greater part of the Engineer troops go now, 
on mobilization, to the field armies, so that the school of saps and mines has 
little by little lost the predominant place which it formerly held. 

Are we to believe, as we sometimes hear, that the powerful effect of 
modern siege artillery will do away with the inch by inch attack in the 
future? It would seem likely that such will be the case when an anti¬ 
quated, incomplete, and badly defended fortress is attacked, as will 
undoubtedly frequently happen. A fortress properly prepared and defend¬ 
ed with a sufficient garrison will, on the contrary, be a very different 
proposition. By such fortresses we particularly understand those which 
are provided with strong works for defending the flanks and intervals, so 
constructed that they cannot be destroyed by distant artillery, and service¬ 
able after the most violent bombardment. 

Is the building of such a fortification possible in the era of modern 
artillery? Without entering into too lengthy a technical discussion, we 
will say merely that the affirmative appears certain, and that it is prudent 
to assume it in any case. The assailant who attacks such a fortress will 
have to choose between a blockade and a regular siege. 

What will be the nature of the works of approach in the sieges of the 
future? It would appear that they fall into two entirely different classes. 

Until a certain distance from the fortress has been reached—a distance 
which will vary according to circumstances— the work will be that of 
putting the positions successively occupied by the assailant in a state of 
defense. To this end the assilant will improve natural cover, and will 
construct deep trenches provided with overhead cover at frequent intervals. 
Concealed communications, and the various approaches, will be so de¬ 
signed as to mutually resist the sorties of the defender. 


35 


The construction of these works is not essentially different from the 
construction of powerful field fortifications on a battlefield. It will be 
mainly carried on by the infantry. The Engineer companies employed 
with them can apply to such works little Of their instruction in sapping 
and still less of their instruction in mining. 

When the assailant has arrived sufficiently close for an assault, he may 
find that his artillery has destroyed the flank defenses of the works and 
their intervals, and has breached a wide passage through the auxiliary de¬ 
fenses, the wire fences, and all the artifices for checking the assailants under 
the fire of the defenders. If this fire then appears sufficiently weakened 
and demoralized, the assault may be delivered at once. 

But the action of the artillery on the essential portions of the works of 
the fortress, and on the auxiliary defenses, may not have been effective. 
In such case the assailant should push his approaches up to the main line 
of the defense, in order to finish with the mine the destruction com¬ 
menced by the cannon. 

The distance over which the assault may be delivered is very variable. 
It depends on many factors, the most important of which is the temper of 
the defenders. If the latter, in spite of the losses and privations of a pro¬ 
tracted siege, have remained active and energetic, an assault delivered over a 
distance may lead to a disaster. If the defender can man his ruined parapets 
with a line of riflemen and can succeed in mounting on them a few rapid- 
fire guns, at the moment when the artillery of the attack has ceased firing 
to avoid injuring its own troops, the assailant may meet a bloody 
repulse. The history of former wars offers many instances of this kind, 
and such an occurrence is even more likely to happen in the future, on 
account of the increased efficiency of modern arms. It will be necessary 
to push the cover for the troops that are to make the assault as close as pos¬ 
sible to their objective. The construction of the necessary approaches under 
the close fire of the defense, the destruction of concrete counterscarps and 
counterscarp galleries, and the underground warfare against the counter¬ 
mines of the enemy, if such should be undertaken, are surely operations 
requiring the utmost skill, and should be prepared for by a training that 
is not necessary in the construction of approaches at a distance from the 
defense. 

If the attacker finds it necessary to push his works as close to the de¬ 
fender as this, the defender will usually endeavor to retard his opponent’s 
progress by means of under-ground warfare, carried on with all the means 
of modern science. 

It would seem, therefore, that for a siege pushed to its extremity, as 


36 


may sometimes occur, the employment of Engineer companies specially 
trained in such warfare will be necessary. But while it must be acknowl¬ 
edged that regular siege warfare must occasionable be carried on, yet 
such conflicts, if not exceptional, would at least be so unfrequent, that no 
very large number of Engineer companies need receive the special instruc¬ 
tion pertaining to it. The present siege companies, with the corresponding 
reserve and territorial companies, should furnish sufficient men to defend 
our own forts, or to attack those of the enemy if the war should fortu¬ 
nately be waged in foreign territory. 

It is a question, therefore, as to whether we should not divide the 
Engineer troops into siege and field companies, and specialize both their 
instruction and their duties. 

Siege corps and garrisons of fortified places would include Engineer 
troops of both classes. The field Engineer troops would be assigned to 
the construction and care of communications in general, and, when 
necessary, to ponton bridges in particular. They would assist the siege 
companies in putting the fortress in a state of defense, and in the con¬ 
struction of advanced posts at a distance from the works. 

With the exception of that portion of the instruction that relates to field 
operations, such as the employment of explosives in demolitions, and 
in breaching walls and auxiliary defenses, the school of mines would 
then be omitted from the instruction of the field companies. The 
little that can now be taught them appears in any event insufficient 
to fit them for any service except that of auxiliaries in the close attack or 
defense of a fortress. Again, such instruction would not seem necessary 
in the preparation of the outer line of resistance on the defensive, or in 
the construction of the distant approaches on the offensive. 

On the other hand saps and mines would become the essential part of 
the instruction of the siege companies. This instruction would include 
field fortifications in addition, but bridges would be taught only to field 
campanies. 

BRIDGES. 

As we have mentioned before, most of the posts of Engineer regiments 
are not suitable for completeing their instruction in ponton-bridge building. 
It is, therefore, necessary to send each year a number of companies to a 
water-course of sufficient breadth and velocity of current, in order to 
complete their instruction. 

The proper method for accomplishing this is doubtful, and of recent 
years there has been no uniformity as regards the river selected, or as to 
the troops designated for the duty. 


37 


Since we have lost the Rhine, the Rhone is the only one of our rivers 
which realizes the most favorable conditions for the instruction of pon- 
toniers. With a very hard bottom offering little hold for anchors, great 
breadth, and a rapid current, it unites all the difficulties which must be 
overcome. 

The ideal arrangement would be to send all the companies that might 
be assigned to ponton work to this river each year. 

There would, however, be two objections to this arrangement, under 
the present conditions at least. 

The first is the necessary expense. As the regiments at Arras, 
Versailles, and Angers are quartered in towns at a long distance from the 
Rhone, the expense of transporting the troops by rail would be heavy, 
and should be reduced to the lowest possible amount. The facilities for 
quartering troops on the hanks of the Rhone are at present very limited, 
and new barracks must be constructed if all the companies are to be sent 
to this river fora sufficiently long period. This would involve a further 
expense that should be avoided if practicable. 

The second objection is the time required for such instruction. This 
would decrease the number of drills that could be devoted to the other 
branches of instruction, and these latter could not be properly taught. 

One solution which was employed, was to send to the Rhone a certain 
number of picked men only, forming a provisional company from each 
regiment. The remainder of the men finished their instruction at rivers 
relatively near the garrison, such as at Elbeuf on the Seine, for instance, 
for the Arras and Versailles regiments. 

Although this procedure removed the first of the objections, it did not 
affect the second. For this reason, undoubtedly, a different system has 
been instituted. Under the new arrangement the Rhone only is utilized 
for completing the instruction of the men. Each regiment sends as many 
drill companies as it has battalions. The divisional and corps companies 
each furnish forty men to be specialized as pontoniers, the remainder 
being instructed as miners.* 

If the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two methods be 
compared, it will be seen at once that the first provides instruction by 

* This specialization is, however, only partial, since it relates only to the higher in¬ 
struction. The enlisted men in the field companies receive at first an elementary 
instruction in both bridging and mining. We would call attention to the difficulties 
of properly carrying out the more detailed instruction of the miners of the field com¬ 
panies, under such conditions. After the companies have sent forty men to the 
bridge instruction there are few left for drill, as ordinarily it is very rarely that the 
company turns out as many as forty men for drill. 



38 


company, but this is not regarded as a very important point. By taking 
care that enough non-commissioned officers are sent to the Rhone, the 
company commanders would secure a sufficient number of chiefs of pon¬ 
ton who are skilled in maneuvering the boats in rapid water. But while 
the chiefs of ponton would be properly drilled for the construction of a 
bridge on §uch rivers as the Rhine or Rhone, it is to be feared that the crews 
would not have sufficient training to work quickly in such a rapid current. 

The second solution, on the other hand, would seem to provide each 
company with a sufficient number of well trained men to form the anchor 
and boat detachments for work in any stream. 

In this case, however, the instruction is not conducted by the captain, 
but by all the officers of the regiment in turn, for these officers take up this 
duty in succession. This is a very serious matter. Its gravity is apparent 
when we examine in detail the way in which the instruction is carried out. 

The drill companies must supply the guard and fatigue details, and 
these absorb a considerable number of men. In addition there are the 
musicians, orderlies, telegraph operators, cooks, etc., who are never present 
at drill. These details reduce considerably the effective strength of the 
forty trained men that the bridge drills should give each company. Even 
the men available for duty are not uniformly instructed. 

In addition to those detailed for duty with the drill companies, the other 
officers of the regiment spend about a week on the Rhone. During this 
time they are each called upon to take charge of two or three drills. As 
is proper, they are careful to see that the drills that they conduct are cor¬ 
rectly executed. They direct the officers who are their assistants to select 
their non-commissioned officers accordingly. The inevitable result is that 
the chiefs of ponton who have shown skill and coolness at the beginning 
of the drill period are always assigned to these most difficult posts, which 
consequently impart the greater training, while the others are put at lash¬ 
ing side rails, constructing the abutments, and, above all, carrying balk 
and chess. The men in their turn are assigned to their duties according to 
their proficiency by the non-commissioned officers in charge of the detach¬ 
ments. Even if they so desired it would be hardly possible for the officers, 
who are being constantly changed, to establish such a rotation of duties 
that all the men would be put through each variety of work a few times. 

The result is that the number of men in each company really instructed 
in building a ponton bridge in a rapid current is reduced from the total 
of forty which it should have, to twenty, fifteen, or even less. This is 
another instance of the unfortunate result of drilling men in special 
platoons, drill companies, or anywhere except in their own companies. 


39 


Neither of the two methods of instruction, successively adopted, appears 
to be quite satisfactory therefore, and it does not seem easy, with the 
present organization of Engineer troops, to find a solution that gives at 
orice efficiency and economy. It is particularly hard to avoid the difficulty 
that arises from the fact that as the bridge drill is rightly considered of 
the highest importance, all the field companies have come to devote so long 
a time to it that the other branches of instruction are appreciably neglected. 

May it not then be asked whether under such conditions, it would not 
be preferable to specialize a number of companies as ponton companies, 
even admitting that such a measure is incompatable with the duties that the 
Engineer companies, as now assigned to the army corps, are called upon 
to perform? 

If one of the Engineer companies of an army corps is to be specialized as a 
ponton company, it would naturally be the corps company. Should not this 
company be able to execute alone all the duties connected with the bridge 
train? 

Let us consider the most unfavorable case; that of an army corps 
marching on two parallel roads with a division of the bridge train in each 
column. The two bridges which might be required in such a case could 
be easily built by a platoon of the corps company, since the work would 
require at the most, for each of the bridges, but 97 men, of whom 28 
(the balk and chess detachments) could be any auxiliaries whatever. If 
an advance guard bridge train marches at the head of each column, its 
service could easily be attended to by a section of the corps company. 

In a word, the available strength of that company, supposing that it is 
reduced almost one-half, will be sufficient in every case to handle, under 
normal conditions, all the material of the bridge train pertaining to the 
army corps. The essential point is that it should be within reach. Now 
it is certain, by reason of the relative position which the units occupy 
in the columns, that the corps company will be able to reach the site of 
the bridge at least as quickly as the bridge train. 

As far as the bridge train is concerned, therefore, it does not appear 
that there would be any difficulty to assigning the duty to the corps 
companies exclusively. Such companies alone would consequently 
receive the corresponding instruction.* 

*In order to treat the question thoroughly, it would be necessary to discuss the 
influence of such a measure on the formation of the reserve, but a study of this nature 
would be out of place here. We may say merely that the sole consequence that 
should result from it would be the necessity of maintaining, in the composition of 
the reserve companies, some ratio between the respective number of the men who 
have served in the corps companies, and those coming from the divisionary com¬ 
panies. It does not seem that any difficulty would result from this. 



40 


The present condition of affairs was predicted by many officers, when 
the pontonier regiments were abolished, and there were some who advo¬ 
cated the reorganization of these regiments by collecting at Angers and at 
Avignon the third companies of the Engineer battalions. 

It would seem that this last arrangement would be unfortunate from 
several points of view. As the corps companies would form separate 
regiments, and as they would be the only troops that were given ponton 
drill, they would gradually allow this portion of the work to monopolize 
their time, and would regard everything else as subservient to it. Under 
such conditions the divisional companies would have to perform all the 
duties in the army corps that fell to the Engineers before the pontoniers 
were abolished. They would be unable to cope with such a task. 
There is another point of great importance, which is that the Engineer 
troops attached to an army corps, should all belong to the same organi¬ 
zation in time of peace. 

Thus specialized, the corps companies would be the only ones that 
would have to be sent to the Rhone to complete their training, and this 
training could more advantageously be conducted, since separate detach¬ 
ments would no longer be grouped into drill companies, but the companies 
would remain intact under the command of their captain, who alone is 
responsible for the instruction of his company. 

These companies would not be on this account mere ponton companies. 
The special instruction in bridge work, however completely carried out, 
would not absorb all the time outside of the purely military drills. 
Their program of instruction would include the use of explosives and 
the construction of field fortifications. 

When the corps companies were not acting as pontoniers—and this 
would be the ordinary condition—they would be employed on the duties 
of constructing or demolishing lines of communication, and in fortifying 
the field of battle.* 

The divisional companies would be trained only in the former Engineer 
bridge instruction, that is to say, they would be drilled, concurrently with 
the corps companies, in the construction of bridges, using material found 
on the spot. 

*The specilization of the corps companies as companies of pontoniers, above 
outlined, could not be regarded as a return pure and simple to the old organization, 
for it would not present the two essential objections which were to be found in this 
latter, viz: 

1st. All the engineer troops having charge of communications in the army corps 
were not united under the same commander. 

2d. The pontonier company could be employed only in the construction of 
bridges. 



41 


FIELD FORTIFICATION. 

The conclusion from the considerations in regard to saps, mines, and 
bridges above set forth, is that if the engineer companies are specialized 
as indicated, field fortifications would be taught to all the companies. It 
would merely be necessary to consider their assignment on mobilization, 
and regulate accordingly the details of the instruction given to each. 
Thus, for example, the division companies, having no longer to deal with 
saps, mines or the bridge equipage, could consequently devote considerable 
time to the works of the battlefield. Company commanders would em¬ 
ploy this time in perfecting their men in excavation, in rapidly laying out 
field works, and particularly in fortifications on varied ground. These 
last drills are the only means of studying in detail the work of such varied 
nature as would fall to them on the battlefield, when acting in conjunction 
with the infantry. 

We have set forth in this appendix the reasons for the specialization of 
Engineer troops. 

We may have overlooked considerations that are opposed to the adoption 
of such a measure. So, leaving the decision to more compentent and 
experienced authorities, let us be careful not to rashly draw final conclus¬ 
ions. Our object is attained if by submitting this work to our superiors 
and comrades, we have added a useful, though modest, contribution to 
the study of the most important question pertaining to the service to 
which we have the honor to belong—the preparation of Engineer troops 
for war. 

POTEZ, 

Capitaine brevete du genie. 


























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